Commentary for Avodah Zarah 13:3

Joseph is angry at R. Abba, not because he said something wrong, but because he said something overly obvious. It was not obvious that the halakhah follows R. Joshua b. Korha, because his was a minority opinion. But it should be obvious that the halakhah follows R. Judah because of a different principle. If the mishnah quotes a dispute and then later quotes one of those opinions anonymously, the halakhah follows the anonymous opinion. The idea is that when composing the Mishnah, R. Judah Hanasi hinted at his own opinion by citing the anonymous voice, with which he agreed, last. As we shall see, this is one of those cases.

Joseph is angry at R. Abba, not because he said something wrong, but because he said something overly obvious. It was not obvious that the halakhah follows R. Joshua b. Korha, because his was a minority opinion. But it should be obvious that the halakhah follows R. Judah because of a different principle. If the mishnah quotes a dispute and then later quotes one of those opinions anonymously, the halakhah follows the anonymous opinion. The idea is that when composing the Mishnah, R. Judah Hanasi hinted at his own opinion by citing the anonymous voice, with which he agreed, last. As we shall see, this is one of those cases.

The dispute between R. Judah and R. Meir was found in Bava Kamma. In Bava Metzia a mishnah teaches that whoever changes the agreement, such as a dyer who dyes the wrong color, has the lesser right. He can claim either the costs or the increased value, whichever is less. This is the same as R. Judah’s opinion.

Huna (who did not rebuke R. Abba) could respond that there is no order to the Mishnah. Perhaps the anonymous statement was issued first.

Huna here clarifies his opinion. There is indeed order within a tractate, but there is no order between different tractates. Thus, if there is a dispute in Bava Kamma and an anonymous opinion in Bava Metzia, the halakhah does not necessarily follow the opinion in Bava Metzia.

Joseph responds that this is not a case of two tractates. Nezikin (Bava Kamma, Metzia and Batra) is one tractate, that later in its development was divided into three.
Alternatively, he could justify his opinion by saying that the anonymous opinion in this case has more authority because it was quoted among “legal and fixed decisions.” These are a set of rules that are taught in a pithy and apodictic manner. These mishnayot are not the typical case law—they are rules.

According to the first opinion, one may not ask another person on Shabbat to do some sort of work with him after Shabbat. But R. Joshua b. Korha says that this is allowed.

Section one of the baraita says that one should not go seeking lenient views. If someone asks a rabbi a question and the rabbi gives a stringent answer, one should not go out and seek a leniency. [We should note, that this does not mean the leniency is wrong in absolute terms. This very source is an interesting statement on the fact that there are often multiple “correct” answers in halakhah, but that in the end, one must be followed].
Section two says that if one asks two rabbis and one is strict and the other lenient, if one rabbi is greater than the other, then his opinion should be followed. If not, then the stricter opinion should be followed.
Joshua b. Korha says that only if the matter is from the Torah must the stricter opinion be followed. If it is from the rabbis, then one may be lenient. The halakhah accords with this opinion.

The context of this baraita is not exactly clear. Rashi says that it refers to robbers and ignoramuses who do teshuvah. According to R. Meir, if after doing teshuvah, they go back to their previous ways, they have lost the ability to be accepted again. In this view, backsliding is an unforgivable sin.
Judah says that if they go back to their previous way of acting with regard to secret matters, then we can no longer trust them. They are in essence acting one way in the public sphere and in another way in private. Such a person has lost all semblance of trustworthiness. But if they reverted in public, then they still have the opportunity to do teshuvah.
There is a second version of R. Judah’s statement. If when they did teshuvah, they observed even secret things, then they are accepted. But if when they did teshuvah, they only observed things in public, they are not accepted. Observing the laws in public and not in private is clearly hypocritical behavior.
Shimon and R. Joshua b. Korha say that those who do teshuvah are always accepted. And you will probably be glad to know, the halakhah follows this opinion.